**Poll of Israeli Jews on Questions**

**Regarding Israeli Security and**

**the Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict**

For the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

**June 2019**

**Research Goal and Methods**

1. **Research Goal**

The general goal of the study was to examine the positions of adult Israeli citizens regarding solutions for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The following subjects were examined in this framework:

* The degree of agreement or opposition to various items in the peace plan expected to be proposed by American President Donald Trump.
* The degree of agreement to the “plan package” which includes the items which interviewees addressed separately, on a case-by-case basis.
* An examination of the marginal benefit of various items in the plan based on the degree of agreement with that item.
* An examination of the effect of various people’s agreement with the plan’s positions.
* Positions on President Trump.
* Positions on Prime Minister Netanyahu.
* Examining the relationship between the evaluation of Trump and positions on the peace plan, if he proposes it.
* Examining the relationship between the evaluation of Netanyahu and positions towards the peace plan if proposed by Trump.
* Voting intentions for the Knesset in both the present political situation and if Netanyahu and Gantz agree to the plan.
1. **Research Population**

The research population was defined as “all Jewish Israeli citizens aged 18 and up.”

Of this population, a representative sample of 500 people was taken and interviewed. The sample was taken using stratified sampling, with the criteria for the strata being: Gender, age, and in the Jewish population – sector (immigrants from the 1990s onward from the Former Soviet Union, veterans), and level of religiosity.

1. **Data Collection**

The collection of data was conducted in a combination of online and phone-based interviews. The interviews were conducted on June 26-30, 2019.

1. **Data Analysis**

A data analysis was conducted for both the overall sample and separately according to the interviewees’ vote in the 2019 election and according to socio-demographic characteristics. In addition, comparative analyses were conducted between the various items of the plan.

The maximal margin of error for the entire sample is +/- 4.5% for the Jewish sample.

In June 2018, a poll was conducted in which some of the questions asked were included in the present poll. A comparative analysis was done between the results of these questions when asked in the present poll and in the poll of 2018.

1. **Report Structure**

The report includes three chapters:

1. **Chapter A:** Data for the entire sample and separate data for the Jewish sector.
2. **Chapter B:** Presentation of the relationship between the interviewee’s vote for Knesset in April 2019 and their positions regarding various items in the plan and towards the plan as a “package.”
3. **Chapter C**: Summary and Conclusion

**FindingsChapter A: Data for the Entire Sample and the Jewish Sector**

1. **Principled position on the establishment of a Palestinian state and separate attitude to different items without them being bundled into a plan “package.”**

The interviewees were told: *“President Trump is expected to present a peace plan between Israel and the Palestinians in the coming months. I am going to read to you a list of proposals, which experts believe are expected to appear in the new peace plan. Regarding each proposal, please tell me whether you are definitely supportive of the proposal, supportive, opposed, or definitely opposed.”*

**Table no. 1: Positions on the establishment of a Palestinian state and on possible items in the agreement establishing it.**

|  | **Total Sample** |
| --- | --- |
|  **A Palestinian state will be established alongside the State of Israel** | Definitely Supportive | 13.9% |
| Supportive | 23.5% |
| Total Supportive | 37.5% |
| Opposed | 17.8% |
| Definitely Opposed | 33.6% |
| Total Opposed | 51.4% |
| Didn’t Respond | 11.1% |
| **Total** | **100.0%** |
| **The Palestinian leadership will recognize Israel as the nation state of the Jewish People** | Definitely Supportive | 66.4% |
| Supportive | 18.8% |
| Total Supportive | 85.2% |
| Opposed | 3.5% |
| Definitely Opposed | 5.2% |
| Total Opposed | 8.7% |
| Didn’t Respond | 6.1% |
| **Total** | **100.0%** |
|  **The settlement blocs will be annexed to Israel** | Definitely Supportive | 52.8% |
| Supportive | 24.6% |
| Total Supportive | 77.4% |
| Opposed | 9.4% |
| Definitely Opposed | 5.7% |
| Total Opposed | 15.1% |
| Didn’t Respond | 7.5% |
| **Total** | **100.0%** |
| **Isolated settlements will be annexed to Israel** | Definitely Supportive | 41.4% |
| Supportive | 22.7% |
| Total Supportive | 64.1% |
| Opposed | 13.0% |
|  Definitely Opposed | 13.6% |
| Total Opposed | 26.6% |
| Didn’t Respond | 9.2% |
| **Total** | **100.0%** |
| **Both settlement blocs and isolated settlements will be annexed to Israel** | Definitely Supportive | 43.7% |
| Supportive | 21.8% |
| Total Supportive | 65.5% |
| Opposed | 13.9% |
| Definitely Opposed | 10.9% |
| Total Opposed | 24.8% |
| Didn’t Respond | 9.7% |
| **The Jordan Valley will remain under permanent Israeli security control** | Definitely Supportive | 63.8% |
| Supportive | 21.4% |
| Total Supportive | 85.1% |
| Opposed | 5.1% |
|  Definitely Opposed | 2.9% |
| Total Opposed | 8.0% |
| Didn’t Respond | 6.9% |
|  | Total | 100.0% |

|  |  | **Jews** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **In exchange for annexing the settlement blocs and isolated settlements to Israel and permanent Israeli security control in the Jordan Valley, Israel will hand over territories within the Green Line bordering on Judea and Samaria and Israeli territories in the Negev bordering on Egypt and on the Palestinian State**  | Definitely Supportive | 8.8% |
| Supportive | 24.8% |
| Total Supportive | **33.6%** |
| Opposed | 18.1% |
| Definitely Opposed | 36.3% |
| Total Opposed | **54.4%** |
| Didn’t Respond | 12.1% |
| **Total** | **100.0%** |
| **The Palestinian state will include all of the Gaza Strip and some 80% of Judea and Samaria. 20% of the West Bank which includes the settlement blocs and isolated settlements will remain under Israeli sovereignty. In exchange for those territories, Israel will offer territories of similar size from territories within Israel, bordering on Judea and Samaria, on the Gaza border, and on the Egyptian border** | Definitely Supportive | 13.0% |
| Supportive | 24.0% |
| Total Supportive | **36.9%** |
| Opposed | 15.7% |
| Definitely Opposed | 33.1% |
| Total Opposed | **48.8%** |
| Didn’t Respond | 14.3% |
| **Total** | **100.0%** |
| **These exchanges of territory will also include “the Israeli Triangle” [Israeli Arab concentrations adjacent to the West Bank] and additional concentrations of Arab population, such that some 200,000 Israeli Arabs will be moved from Israel to the Palestinian state.** | Definitely Supportive | 21.3% |
| Supportive | 26.7% |
| Total Supportive | **48.1%** |
| Opposed | 15.9% |
| Definitely Opposed | 21.8% |
| Total Opposed | **37.7%** |
| Didn’t Respond | 14.3% |
| **Total** | **100.0%** |
| **Any “Right of Return” of Palestinian refugees into Israel will be utterly dismissed** | Definitely Supportive | 60.7% |
| Supportive | 16.3% |
| Total Supportive | **77.0%** |
| Opposed | 7.5% |
| Definitely Opposed | 7.4% |
| Total Opposed | **15.0%** |
| Didn’t Respond | 8.1% |
| **Total** | **100.0%** |
|  **The Temple Mount will remain under Israeli sovereignty** | Definitely Supportive | 48.1% |
| Supportive | 28.6% |
| Total Supportive | **76.8%** |
| Opposed | 8.6% |
| Definitely Opposed | 6.1% |
| Total Opposed | **14.7%** |
| Didn’t Respond | 8.5% |
| **Total** | **100.0%** |
| **The neighborhoods of Jerusalem within the Security Fence will maintain their status as the Israeli capital, including: all the Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem, the Old City, the City of David, and the Mount of Olives. The Temple Mount will remain under Israeli sovereignty. The Palestinian capital will include the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem beyond the Security Fence; over 100,000 Palestinians live in these neighborhoods** | Definitely Supportive | 43.3% |
| Supportive | 27.1% |
| Total Supportive | **70.4%** |
| Opposed | 9.4% |
| Definitely Opposed | 11.1% |
| Total Opposed | **20.5%** |
| Didn’t Respond | 9.1% |
| **Total** | **100.0%** |
|  **A Defense Treaty will be signed between Israel and the United States** | Definitely Supportive | 66.0% |
| Supportive | 21.5% |
| Total Supportive | **87.4%** |
| Opposed | 3.6% |
| Definitely Opposed | 2.8% |
| Total Opposed | **6.4%** |
| Didn’t Respond | 6.2% |
| **Total** | **66.0%** |

**Table no. 1 shows that:**

1. A little over one-third of interviewees (37.5%) express agreement with the establishment of a Palestinian state, even when there are no additional details regarding the characteristics of the state and the price Israel will pay or what it will receive in exchange. About half the interviewees oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state (11% did not respond).
2. As expected, a large majority of interviewees agree to the things Israel will receive in exchange when this is not accompanied by any Israeli concession. But when the former involves giving up territories from within the Green Line, only a few agree to this. Before we present the extent of agreement with what Israel will receive, we should note that the questionnaire examined agreement to each item separately. Therefore, agreement to a particular item, meaning agreement to receive something specific in exchange, does not mean agreement to the establishment of a Palestinian state in exchange for the same. Alongside this, we should assume that receiving the particular item in exchange should increase readiness to agree with the plan.

Below is the list of items to be exchanged according to the percentage of interviewee agreement with that exchange, from highest agreement to lowest:

* Israeli security control from the Jordan to the Sea – 88%
* A defense treaty between Israel and the United States – 87%
* The recognition of Israel as the Jewish nation state by the Palestinian leadership – 85%
* The Jordan Valley remaining under permanent Israeli security control – 85%
* The settlement blocs will be annexed to Israel - 77%
* The Temple Mount remaining under Israeli sovereignty, with the Kingdom of Jordan continuing its role as the guardian of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock – 77%
* An end to the Right of Return of the Palestinians into Israel – 77%
* The entire Jewish part of Jerusalem within the fence – including the Old City, the City of David, the Mount of Olives, and the Temple Mount will remain under Israeli sovereignty. But the Arab neighborhoods (noting that more than 100,000 Palestinians live there) will be established as the capital of the Palestinian state – 70%
* Both the settlement blocs and isolated settlements will be annexed to Israel – 65%
* Isolated settlements will be annexed to Israel – 64%
* Exchange of territories including the transfer of Israeli citizens in these territories to a Palestinian state – 48%
* Exchange of territories without reference to a transfer of Jewish population but noting that the entire Gaza Strip and 80% will be included in the Palestinian state – 37%
* It’s worth noting that the degree of agreement is low when it comes to exchange of territory without the exchange of Arab population – 34%
1. A comparative analysis between the findings of the 2018 poll and the findings of the present one show that changes occurred between the two polls on just two issues: A decline in the number agreeing to an exchange of territory including the transfer of territory with its residents (from 60% in 2018 to 48% in 2019), as well as a decline in those who are willing to see an end to the Right of Return for the Palestinians (from 85% in 2018 to 77% in 2019). On the other questions in this chapter, which were identical in both polls, no change has occurred.
2. **Positions on the plan’s “package” and the consequences of various items and the support of people involved in the plan for support for the same.**
3. **Positions on the plan**

The interviewees were told: “*I will read to you a list of possible items in the peace agreement. After you hear them, please note to what degree you support, or oppose, a peace agreement which includes all these items:*

* A Palestinian state will be established in all parts of the Gaza Strip and in 80% of the West Bank. The Palestinian State will recognize Israel as the nation state of the Jewish People.
* 20% of the West Bank, which includes the settlement blocs and isolated settlements, will remain under Israeli sovereignty. In exchange for those territories, Israel will offer territories of identical size from territories within Israel bordering on Judea and Samaria, on the border of Gaza, and on the border of Egypt in the Negev, including territories in which some 200,000 Israeli Arab residents live. No Jewish settlement will be uprooted.
* The Jordan Valley will remain under permanent Israeli control and remain the supreme security authority in all the territory west of the Jordan. There will be no Right of Return for the Palestinians and Palestinian refugees will enter Israel. In Jerusalem, all the neighborhoods on the Israeli side of the Security Fence including the Old City will remain under Israeli sovereignty. The Temple Mount will remain under Israeli sovereignty and the Kingdom of Jordan will continue its role as the guardian of the al-Aqsa Mosque and of the Dome of the Rock.
* The Palestinian capital will be established on the eastern side of the city, in the area of Arab neighborhoods which lie beyond the Separation Fence and in which some 100,000 Palestinian residents live.”

**Table no. 2: Principled positions on the establishment of a Palestinian state**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Definitely Supportive | 18.4% |
| Supportive | 45.3% |
| **Total Supportive** | **63.7%** |
| Opposed | 12.4% |
| Definitely Opposed | 9.8% |
| **Total Opposed** | **22.2%** |
| Don’t Know | 12.9% |
| Refused to Answer | 1.3% |
| Total | 100.0% |

**Table no. 2 shows that:**

1. The conditions listed above, if accompanying the establishment of a Palestinian state, significantly raise the readiness of interviewees to agree to its establishment. As noted, only 38% of interviewees expressed agreement in principle to the establishment of a Palestinian state, thus agreeing to it even when they were not presented with the actual conditions of the agreement.

Their responses to the question which presents a number of conditions (listed above) show that including these details significantly increases support for the plan: Almost two-thirds of the interviewees (64%) are either definitely supportive of the plan as presented (18%) or are supportive (45%). Only about a quarter (22%) are opposed, and the rest did not express an opinion (14%).

1. A comparative analysis between the results of the 2018 poll and that of the 2019 poll shows that no change in opinion has occurred between these two dates regarding the plan as detailed above.
2. **Forecasted consequences of additional items in the plan for support for the plan as a whole**

The interviewees were presented with a list of additional possible items for the plan, and they were asked regarding each one “If the plan includes this item, will this increase your support for the plan or will it not have any effect on your support for the plan or will it reduce your support for the plan?”

**Table no. 3: Consequences of various items, if included in the plan, for willingness to support the plan**

|  | **Total Sample** |
| --- | --- |
| **If the plan included peace agreements with the Arab states like Saudi Arabia and a process of normalization of relations with the Arab world, would that increase your support for the plan, or not change your support for the plan, or reduce your support for the plan?** | Certainly Increase | 24.4% |
| Think It Will Increase | 29.6% |
| Won’t Change | 26.6% |
| Think It Will Decrease | 4.6% |
| Certainly Decrease | 1.9% |
| **Didn’t Respond** | 12.9% |
| Total | 100.0% |
| **And if the plan included a security treaty between Israel and the US similar to the US commitment to the NATO alliance, would that increase your support for the plan, or not change your support for the plan, or reduce your support for the plan?** | Certainly Increase | 17.8% |
| Think It Will Increase | 28.4% |
| Won’t Change | 36.1% |
| Think It Will Decrease | 2.3% |
| Certainly Decrease | 0.9% |
| **Didn’t Respond** | 14.5% |
| **Total** | 100% |
| **If you knew that the agreement was conditional on bringing down the rule of Hamas in Gaza, would that increase your support for the plan, or not change your support for the plan, or reduce your support for the plan?** | Certainly Increase | 31.3% |
| Think It Will Increase | 28.1% |
| Won’t Change | 23.2% |
| Think It Will Decrease | 2.7% |
| Certainly Decrease | 2.1% |
| **Didn’t Respond** | 12.6% |
| Total | 100.0% |
| **If you knew that the Jordan Valley will be fully annexed to Israel, meaning that the plan will not suffice with Israel remaining the supreme security authority in the entire area west of the Jordan, would that increase your support for the plan, or not change your support for the plan, or reduce your support for the plan?** | Certainly Increase | 19.4% |
| Think It Will Increase | 29.9% |
| Won’t Change | **21.1%** |
| Think It Will Decrease | 5.9% |
| Certainly Decrease | 1.9% |
| **Didn’t Respond** | **16.8%** |
| Total | 100.0% |

**Table no. 3 shows that:**

1. All the items listed significantly increase support for the plan. The most significant increase occurs when talking of bringing down the Hamas government (59% said that would increase their support for the plan). The second most important item is normalization with the Arab states (53% said it would increase their support for the plan). The following two items are the annexation of the Jordan Valley (49% said this would increase their support) and a security treaty with the US (46% said it would increase their support for the plan).
2. A combined analysis of the responses to the question regarding readiness for the establishment for a Palestinian state in the conditions of the plan listed with an examination of the consequences of the additional items creates the following picture:
	1. Inclusion of additional items in the plan which increase Israeli security and the normalization of relations with Arab states increases support for the plan by 8-10% and increases support to a majority of close to three-quarters of those interviewed (between 71% and 74%): Making the acceptance of the plan conditional on bringing down the Hamas government increases support rates to 74%; the annexation of the Jordan Valley to Israel increases support to 73%; normalization of relations with the Arab states increases support to 72%; a security treaty between Israel and the US increases it to 71%. It therefore seems that the inclusion of only one of these items is sufficient to significantly increase support for the plan; adding others in addition will not change it.
	2. A comparative analysis between the findings of the 2018 poll and the 2019 poll shows:
* The contribution of the item of a security treaty with the US in 2019 is significantly higher than this item’s contribution in 2018: While support for the plan in 2018, if it included this item, reached 62%, meaning the item did not at all contribute to support for the plan, in 2019, the scope of support for the plan in light of this item was 71%, meaning an increase of 9% in support.
* Alongside this, the rate of support for the plan, if an item of normalization with the Arab countries was similar in both polls (slightly higher in the current poll, but the difference is small).

The consequences of the other items were not examined in the 2018 poll.

1. **Forecasted Consequences of Support From Individual Leaders for the Plan**

The interviewees were presented with the possibility that various figures would support the plan, and they were asked regarding each one: “*Would his support for the plan increase your tendency to support the plan or not change your support for the plan.”*

The questions were presented regarding the following people:

* Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu
* Opposition Leader Benny Gantz
* The Prime Minister and the Opposition Leader
* The Chief of Staff and the entire defense leadership

**Table no. 4: Consequences of support of various leaders for the plan for the interviewee’s position towards it**

|  | **Total Sample** |
| --- | --- |
| **If Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu supports this plan and says it is good for Israel, would this increase your support for the plan, or would it not change your support for the plan, or would it reduce your support for the plan?** | Would certainly increase my support for the plan | 10.7% |
| Think it would increase my support for the plan | 15.9% |
| **Total Increase** | **26.6%** |
| Would not change my support for the plan | 51.8% |
| Think it would reduce my support for the plan | 5.6% |
| Would certainly reduce my support for the plan | 4.6% |
| **Total Reduction** | **10.2%** |
| Didn’t Respond | 11.4% |
| **If Opposition Leader Benny Gantz supports this plan and says it is good for Israel, would this increase your support for the plan, or would it not change your support for the plan, or would it reduce your support for the plan?** | Would certainly increase my support for the plan | 6.1% |
| Think it would increase my support for the plan | 16.9% |
| **Total Increase** | **23.0%** |
| Would not change my support for the plan | 52.0% |
| Think it would reduce my support for the plan | 6.0% |
| Would certainly reduce my support for the plan | 6.4% |
| **Total Reduction** | **12.5%** |
| Didn’t Respond | 12.5% |
| **If Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Opposition Leader Benny Gantz support this plan and says it is good for Israel, would this increase your support for the plan, or would it not change your support for the plan, or would it reduce your support for the plan?** | Would certainly increase my support for the plan | 10.6% |
| Think it would increase my support for the plan | 26.5% |
| **Total Increase** | **37.1%** |
| Would not change my support for the plan | 41.7% |
| Think it would reduce my support for the plan | 4.8% |
| Would certainly reduce my support for the plan | 3.3% |
| **Total Reduction** | 8.1% |
| Didn’t Respond | 13.1% |
| **If the Chief of Staff and the entire defense leadership support this plan and says it is good for Israel, would this increase your support for the plan, or would it not change your support for the plan, or would it reduce your support for the plan?** | Would certainly increase my support for the plan | 16.8% |
| Think it would increase my support for the plan | 28.6% |
| **Total Increase** | **45.5%** |
| Would not change my support for the plan | 36.5% |
| Think it would reduce my support for the plan | 2.9% |
| Would certainly reduce my support for the plan | 3.0% |
| **Total Reduction** | **5.8%** |
| Didn’t Respond | 12.2% |

**Table no. 4 shows:**

1. About a quarter of those interviewed said that the support of one of the two leaders, Binyamin Netanyahu or Benny Gantz, would increase their support for the plan. The forecasted contribution of Netanyahu’s support is slightly larger than Gantz’s, but the difference is not stark. (Netanyahu’s support will increase the support of 27% of those interviewed and the support of Gantz will increase the support of 23% of those interviewed). As expected, the support of both will bring about agreement with the plan on the part of people with different political stances and increase support for the plan by over a third of interviewees (37% said that the support of both figures for the plan would also increase their support for it).
2. The support of the Chief of Staff and the entire defense leadership leads almost half of those interviewed to report an expected increase in their support for the plan.
3. **Positions on annexation of Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria**

The interviewees were asked, *“Regardless of the Trump Plan, would you support or oppose the annexation of some 20% of the territory of Judea and Samaria including the settlement blocs and all isolated settlements, if the US recognizes these annexed territories as part of the State of Israel?”*

**Table no. 5: Positions on annexation of territories**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Definitely Supportive | 30.4% |
| Supportive | 33.8% |
| **Total Supportive** | 64.3% |
| Opposed | 12.6% |
| Definitely Opposed | 7.2% |
| **Total Opposed** | 19.8% |
| Don’t Know | 14.1% |
| Refused to Answer | 1.8% |
| Total | 100.0% |

**Table no. 5 shows that** two-thirds (64%) either definitely support (30%) or are supportive (34%) of the annexation of settlement blocs and isolated settlements in Judea and Samaria to Israel, if the US recognizes the annexation.

1. **Preferred Timing of the Publication of Trump’s peace plan**

The interviewees were asked “What do you prefer – that President Trump wait with the publication of the peace plan until after elections in Israel, or that President Trump publish his peace plan even before the elections?”

**Table no. 6: Preferences regarding the timing of publication of Trump’s peace plan**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| President Trump should wait to publish the peace plan until after Israeli elections | 36.7% |
| President Trump should publish his peace plan before the elections | 40.3% |
| Don’t Know | 20.9% |
| Refused | 2.0% |
| Total | 100.0% |

**Table no. 6 shows** that there is a near-tie between those who prefer Trump wait with publishing his plan until after the elections in September 2019 (37%) and those who prefer that the plan be published before the elections (40%).

1. **Voting intentions in the Knesset elections and expected consequences of the support of the Prime Minister and Opposition Leader for the Plan for voting intent.**

**Voting intentions were examined regarding each one of the following two conditions:**

* The present situation: *“If the elections for Knesset took place today, which list would you vote for?”*
* In light of the publication of Trump’s peace plan and the support of the Prime Minister and the Opposition Leader for the Plan: *“If President Trump decides to present his complete plan before the elections and if both Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Opposition Chairman Benny Gantz announce that they support the plan, what list will you vote for as a result in the coming elections for Knesset?”*

Interviewees who said in reference to one or both of these questions that they hadn’t decided were asked “What list do you tend towards more?”

**Table no. 7: Voting intentions under the two conditions listed above**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **If the elections for Knesset took place today, which list would you vote for?** | **If President Trump decides to present his complete plan before the elections and if both Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Opposition Chairman Benny Gantz announce that they support the plan, what list will you vote for as a result in the coming elections for Knesset?** |
| The Likud headed by Binyamin Netanyahu | 25.8% | 25.9% |
| Blue-White headed by Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid | 25.9% | 24.2% |
| Israel Beiteinu headed by Avigdor Liberman | 8.0% | 8.0% |
| United Torah Judaism headed by Yaakov Litzman | 5.2% | 6.3% |
| Labor | 4.2% | 4.4% |
| Shas headed by Aryeh Deri | 4.2% | 4.1% |
| United Right Party headed by Rabbi Rafi Peretz | 4.2% | 4.0% |
| New Right headed by Naftali Bennet and Ayelet Shaked | 3.8% | 4.0% |
| Zehut headed by Moshe Feiglin | 2.3% | 3.4% |
| Meretz | 2.7% | 2.8% |
| Joint Arab List headed by Ayman Odeh | 0.7% | 0.4% |
| Another Party | 2.6% | 1.7% |
| Don’t Know | 5.2% | 5.8% |
| Refused | 1.4% | 1.7% |
| Won’t Vote | 3.8% | 3.4% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% |

**Table no. 7 shows that:**

1. In the present situation, the Right-Charedi bloc receives 53.6% of support from the interviewees, as opposed to 33.5% of support for the Center-Left bloc. 13% did not report support for any party.
2. The publication of the Trump plan before the elections, if accompanied by the support of both Netanyahu and Gantz, will have only minimal influence: A decline of 1.7% in support for Blue-White (of opponents to the plan) and an unexplained increase of 1.1% in support for United Torah Judaism. The balance between the blocs changes a bit in favor of the Right-Charedi bloc (55.7% as opposed to 31.8% for the Center-Left. 12.6% did not report support for any party.
3. **Positions on President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu**
4. **Positions on President Trump**

The interviewees were asked: *“Is your opinion on American President Donald Trump positive or negative?”*

**Table no. 8: Positions on Trump**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Very Positive | 30.5% |
| Positive | 38.3% |
| **Total Positive** | **68.8%** |
| Negative | 14.9% |
| Very Negative | 5.3% |
| **Total Negative** | **20.2%** |
| Don’t Know | 9.1% |
| Refuse to Answer | 1.9% |
| Total | 100.0% |

Another question which referred to President Trump was “Do the American gestures on the matter of transferring the embassy to Jerusalem and recognition of the Golan Heights, positively affect your attitude towards President Trump, or negatively affect your attitude towards President Trump, or have no influence on your attitude towards the President.”

**Table no. 8: Interviewees’ report of the consequences of Trump’s gestures on positions on the man himself.**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  Very Positive Influence | 30.2% |
| Positive Influence | 37.2% |
| **Total Positive** | **67.5%** |
| Has No Influence | 20.3% |
| Negative Influence | 4.1% |
| Very Negative Influence | 2.2% |
| **Total Negative** | **6.3%** |
| Don’t Know | 4.6% |
| Refused to Answer | 1.3% |
| Total | 100.0% |

**Table 8 and 9 show:**

1. The balance of estimation of Trump tends significantly in the positive direction (69% expressed a positive position as opposed to 20% with a negative one and 11% who didn’t express a view).
2. According to the interviewees, the American gestures involving the transfer of the embassy to Jerusalem and the recognition of the annexation of the Golan Heights contribute to positive positions on Trump: 67% (almost everyone who stated a positive opinion on Trump) also said that the gestures have a very positive influence (30%) or a ositive influence (37%) on their view of Trump, 20% said that these gestures have no influence, and just 6% said that the gestures have a negative influence on their view of Trump.

Alongside this, it is likely that the gestures strengthened positive assessments of President Trump but it is not likely that everyone with a positive influence on Trump stated the same due to his recent gestures.

1. No change has occurred in positions on Trump between the 2018 and 2019 polls. In other words, the positive views are not a result of the gestures, but the cumulative result of Trump’s handling of Israel.

1. **Attitude Towards Prime Minister Netanyahu**

The interviewees were asked: “Are you satisfied or not satisfied at the performance of Binyamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister?” and “All told, is your opinion on Binyamin Netanyahu positive or negative?”

**Table no. 10. Satisfaction with Netanyahu’s Performance**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Very Satisfied | 15.3% |
| Satisfied | 30.5% |
| **Total Satisfied**  | **45.9%** |
| Dissatisfied | 19.1% |
| Very Dissatisfied | 28.3% |
| **Total Dissatisfied** | **47.4%** |
| Don’t Know | 4.8% |
| Refused to Answer | 2.0% |
| Total | 100.0% |

**Table no. 11: Opinions on Netanyahu**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Very Positive | 17.2% |
| Positive | 32.9% |
| **Total Positive** | **50.0%** |
| Negative | 19.7% |
| Very Negative | 23.6% |
| **Total Negative** | **43.3%** |
| No Opinion | 5.5% |
| Refuse to Answer | 1.1% |
| Total | 100.0% |

**Tables 10 and 11 show that:**

1. There is a near-tie between those who are satisfied and those who are dissatisfied with Netanyahu’s performance as Prime Minister: 46% are either very satisfied with his performance (15%) or satisfied with it (31%); this, as opposed to 47% who are either dissatisfied (19%) or very dissatisfied (28%) with his performance.
2. The percentage of people with a positive view of Netanyahu (50%) is similar to the percentage of people who are satisfied with his performance; 43% say their view of Netanyahu is negative.
3. A decline occurred between the poll of 2018 and the poll of 2019 in the number of those satisfied with Netanyahu’s performance (from 57% to 46%) and a similar rise in the number of those who are not satisfied with his performance (from 37% to 47%).

Regarding the general opinion of Netanyahu (positive or negative) only small, not statistically significant changes occurred (a decline from 54% to 50% of those who have a positive opinion of the man and an increase from 38% to 43% among those who have a negative opinion of him).

**Chapter B: Relationship between Vote for Knesset in the April 2019 Elections and the Positions of the Interviewees**

**Table no. 12: Relationship between vote for Knesset in the April 2019 elections and the principled position regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state and attitude to the different items in the plan.**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| A Palestinian state will be established alongside the State of Israel | Definitely Supportive | 6.4% | 24.7% |   | 6.6% | 21.5% | 13.9% |
| Supportive | 20.8% | 32.4% | 12.3% | 17.8% | 39.2% | 23.5% |
| Opposed | 20.2% | 16.5% | 26.4% | 20.6% | 16.3% | 17.8% |
| Definitely Opposed | 44.3% | 14.6% | 55.6% | 47.4% | 10.3% | 33.6% |
| Don’t Know | 7.3% | 10.3% | 4.0% | 6.2% | 11.2% | 9.3% |
| Refused to Answer | 0.9% | 1.6% | 1.7% | 1.4% | 1.5% | 1.8% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| The Palestinian leadership will recognize the State of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish People | Definitely Supportive | 68.7% | 68.6% | 64.3% | 67.9% | 70.1% | 66.4% |
| Supportive | 16.0% | 21.8% | 15.9% | 16.3% | 22.7% | 18.8% |
| Opposed | 3.8% | 3.1% | 8.0% | 2.8% | 2.6% | 3.5% |
| Definitely Opposed | 6.4% | 2.4% | 10.0% | 7.9% | 1.6% | 5.2% |
| Don’t Know | 4.5% | 2.5% | 1.8% | 4.0% | 1.5% | 4.2% |
| Refused to Answer | 0.6% | 1.6% |   | 1.0% | 1.5% | 1.8% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| The settlement blocs will be annexed to Israel | Definitely Supportive | 61.5% | 43.5% | 67.0% | 61.0% | 42.4% | 52.8% |
| Supportive | 19.0% | 29.0% | 23.2% | 18.0% | 31.9% | 24.6% |
| Opposed | 6.7% | 16.0% | 3.9% | 4.8% | 15.3% | 9.4% |
| Definitely Opposed | 7.0% | 4.7% | 4.1% | 9.6% | 3.5% | 5.7% |
| Don’t Know | 5.8% | 4.8% | 1.8% | 6.6% | 4.5% | 6.1% |
| Refused to Answer |   | 2.1% |   |   | 2.3% | 1.4% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Isolated settlements will be annexed to Israel | Definitely Supportive | 51.3% | 26.8% | 54.1% | 49.9% | 24.6% | 41.4% |
| Supportive | 19.3% | 25.8% | 30.6% | 19.1% | 31.1% | 22.7% |
| Opposed | 8.3% | 18.2% | 5.8% | 7.4% | 18.5% | 13.0% |
| Definitely Opposed | 13.2% | 17.0% | 7.7% | 16.5% | 12.8% | 13.6% |
| Don’t Know | 7.8% | 10.2% | 1.8% | 7.2% | 10.7% | 7.9% |
| Refused to Answer |   | 2.1% |   |   | 2.3% | 1.3% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Both the settlement blocs and isolated settlements will be annexed to Israel | Definitely Supportive | 55.9% | 29.1% | 59.6% | 54.2% | 26.9% | 43.7% |
| Supportive | 20.8% | 22.9% | 26.9% | 20.5% | 26.8% | 21.8% |
| Opposed | 6.9% | 23.7% | 5.8% | 5.5% | 25.2% | 13.9% |
| Definitely Opposed | 8.0% | 13.5% | 4.1% | 11.9% | 9.6% | 10.9% |
| Don’t Know | 8.2% | 8.7% | 1.8% | 7.9% | 9.9% | 8.2% |
| Refused to Answer | 0.3% | 2.1% | 1.8% |   | 1.5% | 1.6% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| The Jordan Valley will remain under permanent Israeli security control | Definitely Supportive | 71.2% | 56.8% | 78.6% | 70.3% | 60.7% | 63.8% |
| Supportive | 16.3% | 27.6% | 14.0% | 16.3% | 31.1% | 21.4% |
| Opposed | 3.4% | 7.3% | 1.8% | 3.5% | 3.7% | 5.1% |
| Definitely Opposed | 4.1% | 1.9% | 1.8% | 5.3% | 1.4% | 2.9% |
| Don’t Know | 4.9% | 5.3% | 3.7% | 4.5% | 3.0% | 5.8% |
| Refused to Answer |   | 1.1% |   |   |   | 1.1% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| In exchange for annexing the settlement blocs and isolated settlements to Israel and permanent Israeli security control in the Jordan Valley, Israel will hand over territories within the Green Line bordering on Judea and Samaria and Israeli territories in the Negev bordering on Egypt on the Palestinian State | Definitely Supportive | 6.6% | 11.3% | 7.8% | 5.5% | 11.7% | 8.8% |
| Supportive | 22.1% | 32.5% | 15.8% | 19.2% | 34.9% | 24.8% |
| Opposed | 15.6% | 22.5% | 20.8% | 16.1% | 25.0% | 18.1% |
| Definitely Opposed | 43.3% | 24.3% | 44.5% | 47.4% | 21.6% | 36.3% |
| Don’t Know | 10.8% | 8.2% | 11.0% | 10.9% | 6.8% | 10.5% |
| Refused to Answer | 1.5% | 1.1% |   | 1.0% |   | 1.5% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| The Palestinian state will include all of the Gaza Strip and some 80% of Judea and Samaria. 20% of the West Bank which includes the settlement blocs and isolated settlements will remain under Israeli sovereignty. In exchange for those territories, Israel will offer territories of similar size from territories within Israel, bordering on Judea and Samaria, on the Gaza border, and on the Egyptian border | Definitely Supportive | 16.6% | 12.2% | 4.0% | 19.0% | 13.5% | 13.0% |
| Supportive | 17.6% | 31.0% | 29.2% | 13.8% | 33.5% | 24.0% |
| Opposed | 13.9% | 17.1% | 26.0% | 14.9% | 18.9% | 15.7% |
| Definitely Opposed | 37.8% | 25.7% | 35.3% | 39.7% | 20.3% | 33.1% |
| Don’t Know | 11.2% | 12.5% | 3.7% | 10.6% | 12.3% | 11.4% |
| Refused to Answer | 2.8% | 1.4% | 1.8% | 2.0% | 1.5% | 2.9% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| These exchanges of territory will also include “the Israeli-Arab Triangle” and additional concentrations of Arab population, such that some 200,000 Israeli Arabs will be moved from Israel to the Palestinian state | Definitely Supportive | 24.1% | 17.2% | 14.0% | 24.7% | 19.0% | 21.3% |
| Supportive | 24.9% | 30.9% | 33.0% | 25.0% | 33.2% | 26.7% |
| Opposed | 15.4% | 19.6% | 16.8% | 14.7% | 18.9% | 15.9% |
| Definitely Opposed | 20.1% | 18.1% | 34.5% | 20.7% | 15.4% | 21.8% |
| Don’t Know | 13.4% | 14.2% | 1.8% | 13.9% | 13.6% | 12.7% |
| Refused to Answer | 2.1% |   |   | 1.0% |   | 1.6% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Any “Right of Return” of Palestinian refugees into Israel will be utterly dismissed | Definitely Supportive | 67.1% | 52.7% | 69.0% | 66.1% | 54.1% | 60.7% |
| Supportive | 12.6% | 21.8% | 16.4% | 11.2% | 23.2% | 16.3% |
| Opposed | 5.4% | 11.6% | 9.1% | 4.2% | 9.9% | 7.5% |
| Definitely Opposed | 8.0% | 7.6% | 1.8% | 9.9% | 6.9% | 7.4% |
| Don’t Know | 7.0% | 5.8% | 3.7% | 8.5% | 5.3% | 7.5% |
| Refused to Answer |   | 0.4% |   |   | 0.7% | 0.6% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Security control of the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea will remain in Israeli hands | Definitely Supportive | 76.0% | 59.3% | 78.2% | 77.6% | 62.0% | 68.3% |
| Supportive | 14.1% | 27.7% | 9.0% | 12.1% | 31.4% | 19.2% |
| Opposed | 2.4% | 5.7% | 3.6% | 1.8% | 3.0% | 3.5% |
| Definitely Opposed | 3.5% | 2.5% | 5.5% | 4.2% | 0.8% | 3.3% |
| Don’t Know | 3.6% | 4.3% | 3.7% | 3.6% | 2.8% | 4.7% |
| Refused to Answer | 0.4% | 0.5% |   | 0.7% |   | 1.1% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| The Temple Mount will remain under Israeli sovereignty. The Kingdom of Jordan will continue its role as the guardian of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock | Definitely Supportive | 52.1% | 44.6% | 38.9% | 58.8% | 52.0% | 48.1% |
| Supportive | 24.0% | 34.8% | 34.9% | 20.4% | 38.0% | 28.6% |
| Opposed | 9.0% | 11.0% | 9.2% | 6.0% | 6.8% | 8.6% |
| Definitely Opposed | 8.2% | 4.3% | 4.0% | 7.1% | 1.7% | 6.1% |
| Don’t Know | 6.2% | 4.9% | 5.5% | 6.9% | 1.6% | 6.7% |
| Refused to Answer | 0.5% | 0.5% | 7.4% | 0.7% |   | 1.8% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| The neighborhoods of Jerusalem within the Security Fence will maintain their status as the Israeli capital, including: All the Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem, the Old City, the City of David, and the Mount of Olives. The Temple Mount will remain under Israeli sovereignty. The Palestinian capital will include the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem beyond the Security Fence; over 100,000 Palestinians live in these neighborhoods | Definitely Supportive | 41.8% | 42.6% | 49.6% | 44.2% | 47.7% | 43.3% |
| Supportive | 25.3% | 34.7% | 20.1% | 23.7% | 38.2% | 27.1% |
| Opposed | 11.7% | 7.2% | 12.9% | 12.8% | 3.4% | 9.4% |
| Definitely Opposed | 12.7% | 7.0% | 10.0% | 10.9% | 4.8% | 11.1% |
| Don’t Know | 6.3% | 8.0% | 3.7% | 5.9% | 6.0% | 7.0% |
| Refused to Answer | 2.3% | 0.5% | 3.7% | 2.5% |   | 2.1% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| A defense treaty will be signed between Israel and the United States | Definitely Supportive | 69.0% | 66.7% | 63.5% | 71.3% | 69.1% | 66.0% |
| Supportive | 16.7% | 24.4% | 21.8% | 14.0% | 26.8% | 21.5% |
| Opposed | 3.7% | 3.8% | 9.1% | 2.0% | 1.5% | 3.6% |
| Definitely Opposed | 3.6% | 2.1% |   | 4.4% | 1.0% | 2.8% |
| Don’t Know | 6.0% | 2.5% | 3.7% | 7.4% | 1.6% | 4.9% |
| Refused to Answer | 1.0% | 0.6% | 1.8% | 0.7% |   | 1.3% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |

**Table 12 shows that:**

1. As expected, there is a connection between the bloc interviewees’ support and their principled stance on a Palestinian state: Support goes down from 57% for the Center-Left bloc, to 27% for the Right bloc, to 12% among Charedim.
2. A significant majority of interviewees for all three blocs – Center-Left, Right, and Charedi – support the following items:
* The Palestinian leadership recognizing of Israel as a Jewish State
* Annexation of the large settlement blocs
* Security control of the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea
* The Temple Mount under Israeli sovereignty with Jordan continuing to serve as the guardian of the al-Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock.
* A defense treaty between Israel and the United States
* Definition of Jerusalem’s jurisdiction (on this matter, agreement from the Center-Left is significantly higher – 78% - than the Right – 67%, and Charedim – 69%)
1. As for annexing isolated settlements, just half of the Left and Center support this, as opposed to 71% on the Right and 84% among Charedim.
2. As for Israeli territorial compensation for the annexation, land for land, there is a minority of supporters in all blocs.

**Table no. 13: Relationship between April 2019 vote and willingness to establish a Palestinian state on conditions favorable to Israel**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | **Right** | **Left and Center** | **Charedim** | **Likud** | **Blue-White** | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Before you is a list of possible items in the peace deal. After you hear them, please note to what degree you support, or oppose, a peace agreement which includes all these items.A Palestinian state will be established throughout the entire Gaza Strip and in 80% of the West Bank. The Palestinian state will recognize Israel as the nation state of the Jewish People. | Definitely Supportive | 16.3% | 20.6% | 26.6% | 17.7% | 21.0% | 18.4% |
| Supportive | 45.7% | 46.5% | 43.5% | 43.5% | 49.3% | 45.3% |
| Opposed | 12.6% | 15.2% | 5.8% | 14.3% | 14.5% | 12.4% |
| Definitely Opposed | 10.2% | 4.4% | 18.1% | 9.3% | 3.1% | 9.8% |
| Don’t Know | 14.4% | 12.8% | 5.9% | 14.3% | 12.0% | 12.9% |
| Refused to Answer | 0.8% | 0.5% |   | 0.9% |   | 1.3% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |

**Table no. 13 shows that** there is a majority of support in all the blocs without significant differences.

**Table no. 14: Consequences of adding various conditions in the plan for willingness to support the plan**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | **Right** | **Left and Center** | **Charedim** | **Likud** | **Blue-White** | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| If the plan included peace agreements with the Arab states like Saudi Arabia and a process of normalization of relations with the Arab world, would that increase your support for the plan, or not change your support for the plan, or reduce your support for the plan? | Definitely Supportive | 44.6% | 59.4% | 48.7% | 43.4% | 62.9% | 50.1% |
| Supportive | 23.7% | 21.2% | 25.4% | 22.9% | 18.8% | 21.9% |
| Opposed | 11.9% | 10.2% | 10.7% | 14.5% | 10.8% | 10.8% |
| Very Opposed | 8.2% | 2.9% | 9.2% | 6.6% | 1.3% | 7.2% |
| Didn’t Respond | 11.6% | 6.4% | 5.9% | 12.6% | 6.2% | 9.9% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | **Right** | **Left and Center** | **Charedim** | **Likud** | **Blue-White** | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| And if the plan included a security treaty between Israel and the US similar to the US’ commitment to the NATO alliance, would that increase your support for the plan, or not change your support for the plan, or reduce your support for the plan? | Definitely Supportive | 45.2% | 50.2% | 49.9% | 45.2% | 54.5% | 45.0% |
| Supportive | 23.6% | 27.1% | 20.2% | 24.0% | 27.4% | 26.0% |
| Opposed | 10.7% | 10.3% | 9.5% | 11.9% | 8.8% | 10.3% |
| Very Opposed | 8.5% | 4.0% | 14.4% | 7.2% | 3.1% | 8.3% |
| Didn’t Respond | 11.9% | 8.4% | 5.9% | 11.7% | 6.3% | 10.3% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | **Right** | **Left and Center** | **Charedim** | **Likud** | **Blue-White** | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| If you knew that the agreement was conditional on bringing down the rule of Hamas in Gaza, would that increase your support for the plan, or not change your support for the plan, or reduce your support for the plan? | Definitely Supportive | 51.2% | 54.3% | 55.5% | 53.0% | 56.4% | 52.4% |
| Supportive | 21.6% | 26.1% | 18.4% | 20.4% | 26.1% | 21.9% |
| Opposed | 9.7% | 9.2% | 16.6% | 10.6% | 9.8% | 10.8% |
| Very Opposed | 7.5% | 2.4% | 5.5% | 5.4% | 0.6% | 5.5% |
| Didn’t Respond | 10.1% | 7.9% | 4.1% | 10.5% | 7.0% | 9.3% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | **Right** | **Left and Center** | **Charedim** | **Likud** | **Blue-White** | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
|  | Definitely Supportive | 41.6% | 47.8% | 57.3% | 39.1% | 53.1% | 44.5% |
| If you knew that the Jordan Valley will be fully annexed to Israel, meaning that the plan will not suffice with Israel remaining the supreme security authority in the entire area west of the Jordan, would that increase your support for the plan, or not change your support for the plan, or reduce your support for the plan? | Supportive | 31.3% | 28.0% | 14.7% | 32.8% | 24.4% | 28.2% |
| Opposed | 7.8% | 10.8% | 12.9% | 9.7% | 11.4% | 10.1% |
| Very Opposed | 8.0% | 3.3% | 9.2% | 5.7% | 1.3% | 6.3% |
| Didn’t Respond | 11.4% | 10.1% | 5.9% | 12.7% | 9.7% | 10.9% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |

**Table no. 14 shows that** support for the plan increases in all three blocs when the various conditions are added; this finding holds true in reference to all conditions examined.

**Table no. 15: Expected consequences of support of various figures for the plan**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| If Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu supports this plan and says it is good for Israel, would this increase your support for the plan, or would it not change your support for the plan, or would it reduce your support for the plan? | Would certainly increase my support for the plan | 17.2% | 4.9% | 17.1% | 21.7% | 5.3% | 10.7% |
| Think it would increase my support for the plan | 21.7% | 7.3% | 25.8% | 24.7% | 7.7% | 15.9% |
| Would not change my support for the plan | 47.4% | 66.5% | 30.5% | 39.6% | 68.7% | 51.8% |
| Think it would decrease my support for the plan | 3.1% | 6.9% | 12.3% | 2.6% | 5.5% | 5.6% |
| Would certainly decrease my support for the plan | 1.4% | 6.8% | 3.9% | 2.2% | 5.1% | 4.6% |
| Don’t know | 7.9% | 5.1% | 10.4% | 7.6% | 6.2% | 9.0% |
| Refused to answer | 1.3% | 2.5% |   | 1.6% | 1.5% | 2.4% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| If Opposition Leader Benny Gantz supports this plan and says it is good for Israel, would this increase your support for the plan, or would it not change your support for the plan, or would it reduce your support for the plan? | Would certainly increase my support for the plan | 7.3% | 7.9% | 1.8% | 7.6% | 9.3% | 6.1% |
| Think it would increase my support for the plan | 11.9% | 22.7% | 12.2% | 10.7% | 27.2% | 16.9% |
| Would not change my support for the plan | 49.8% | 56.8% | 60.0% | 48.1% | 54.1% | 52.0% |
| Think it would decrease my support for the plan | 9.0% | 2.4% | 9.2% | 11.5% | 1.6% | 6.0% |
| Would certainly decrease my support for the plan | 9.4% | 2.2% | 8.7% | 10.3% |   | 6.4% |
| Don’t know | 10.4% | 4.9% | 8.1% | 9.4% | 6.0% | 9.5% |
| Refused to answer | 2.2% | 3.1% |   | 2.3% | 1.7% | 3.0% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| If Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Opposition Leader Benny Gantz support this plan and says it is good for Israel, would this increase your support for the plan, or would it not change your support for the plan, or would it reduce your support for the plan? | Would certainly increase my support for the plan | 12.3% | 10.4% | 5.5% | 15.8% | 14.0% | 10.6% |
| Think it would increase my support for the plan | 24.9% | 32.1% | 30.7% | 23.0% | 32.6% | 26.5% |
| Would not change my support for the plan | 44.7% | 47.6% | 30.9% | 40.2% | 42.7% | 41.7% |
| Think it would decrease my support for the plan | 2.6% | 1.1% | 11.6% | 3.5% | 0.9% | 4.8% |
| Would certainly decrease my support for the plan | 4.3% | 0.5% | 1.8% | 4.7% |   | 3.3% |
| Don’t know | 10.0% | 5.8% | 19.5% | 10.8% | 7.6% | 10.7% |
| Refused to answer | 1.1% | 2.5% |   | 1.9% | 2.2% | 2.4% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| If the Chief of Staff and the entire defense leadership supports this plan and says it is good for Israel, would this increase your support for the plan, or would it not change your support for the plan, or would it reduce your support for the plan? | Would certainly increase my support for the plan | 16.4% | 21.0% | 9.2% | 17.3% | 27.9% | 16.8% |
| Think it would increase my support for the plan | 25.1% | 36.3% | 27.0% | 26.1% | 36.7% | 28.6% |
| Would not change my support for the plan | 41.1% | 32.2% | 34.7% | 39.2% | 26.8% | 36.5% |
| Think it would decrease my support for the plan | 1.7% | 1.0% | 11.4% | 2.1% | 0.8% | 2.9% |
| Would certainly decrease my support for the plan | 3.8% | 2.2% | 1.8% | 3.7% | 2.5% | 3.0% |
| Don’t know | 10.6% | 6.1% | 14.1% | 10.8% | 5.4% | 10.4% |
| Refused to answer | 1.4% | 1.1% | 1.8% | 0.9% |   | 1.8% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |

**Table no. 15 shows that:**

1. As expected, Netanyahu’s support strengthens support among people on the Right and Charedim (38% and 43%, respectively, said that it would increase their support for the plan) and less significantly increases the support of people on the Center-Left (12%).

By contrast, Gantz support increases, as expected, the support of the Center-Left (30% said they would increase their support) but less so the Right and Charedim (19% and 13%, respectively).

1. The support of both figures strengthens support for the plan in all blocs (between 36% and 42%).
2. The support of the Chief of Staff and the defense leadership primarily strengthens the support of people on the Center-Left (57%) as opposed to 41% of supporters of the Right who saidthey would increase their support and 36% among Charedim who said they would do the same.

**Table no. 16: The relationship between the interviewee’s vote for Knesset in April 2019 and support for annexing territories to Israel**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Regardless of the Trump Plan, would you support or oppose the annexation of some 20% of the territory of Judea and Samaria including the settlement blocs and all isolated settlements, if the US recognizes these annexed territories as part of the State of Israel? | Definitely Supportive | 40.9% | 23.2% | 31.4% | 34.2% | 20.8% | 30.4% |
| Supportive | 31.7% | 38.8% | 34.7% | 36.3% | 45.6% | 33.8% |
| Opposed | 9.1% | 13.3% | 14.7% | 9.1% | 15.0% | 12.6% |
| Definitely Opposed | 5.8% | 9.1% | 7.4% | 8.2% | 3.6% | 7.2% |
| Don’t Know | 11.5% | 14.0% | 9.6% | 11.3% | 15.0% | 14.1% |
| Refused to Answer | 1.0% | 1.7% | 2.1% | 0.9% |   | 1.8% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |

**Table no. 16 shows that** all blocs contains a majority in support of annexation. This majority increases from 61% among the Center-Left to 65% among Charedim to 62% among supporters of the Right.

**Table no. 17: The relationship between the interviewee’s vote for Knesset in April 2019 and their preference for the timing of publication of Trump’s peace plan**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | **Right** | **Left and Center** | **Charedim** | **Likud** | **Blue-White** | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| **Which of the following do you prefer?** | **President Trump waits to publish the peace plan until after elections in Israel** | 37.2% | 37.9% | 35.8% | 41.7% | 43.8% | 36.7% |
| **President Trump publishes his peace plan already before the elections** | 37.5% | 45.6% | 42.1% | 39.8% | 42.7% | 40.3% |
| **Don’t Know** | 22.5% | 15.4% | 22.1% | 16.0% | 13.5% | 20.9% |
| **Refused** | 2.8% | 1.2% |   | 2.4% |   | 2.0% |
| **Total** | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |

**Table no. 17 shows that** both the Center-Left and Charedim have a slight preference for publishing the plan already before the elections, while there is a near-tie on the Right between those who prefer publication before the election and putting publication off until afterwards.

**Table no. 18: The relationship between the interviewee’s vote for Knesset in April 2019 and positions on Trump**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Is your opinion on American President Donald Trump positive or negative? | Very Positive | 43.3% | 15.6% | 44.0% | 50.3% | 11.4% | 30.5% |
| Positive | 42.6% | 35.4% | 36.6% | 39.7% | 40.8% | 38.3% |
| Negative | 5.8% | 26.5% | 7.7% | 3.7% | 28.6% | 14.9% |
| Very Negative |   | 12.3% |   |   | 9.4% | 5.3% |
| Don’t Know | 8.0% | 9.3% | 8.1% | 6.2% | 9.0% | 9.1% |
| Refused to Answer | 0.4% | 0.9% | 3.5% |   | 0.7% | 1.9% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Do the American gestures on the matter of transferring the embassy to Jerusalem and recognition of the Golan Heights, positively affect your attitude towards President Trump, or negatively affect your attitude towards President Trump or have no influence on your attitude towards the President? | Very Positive Influence | 40.9% | 19.9% | 45.8% | 40.0% | 14.6% | 30.2% |
| Positive Influence | 41.1% | 30.8% | 39.2% | 42.6% | 37.0% | 37.2% |
| No Influence | 10.6% | 32.8% | 7.4% | 10.4% | 32.7% | 20.3% |
| Negative Influence | 1.3% | 7.6% |   | 1.4% | 7.7% | 4.1% |
| Very Negative Influence | 1.0% | 4.1% |   |   | 2.7% | 2.2% |
| Don’t Know | 4.8% | 3.2% | 3.7% | 5.6% | 4.5% | 4.6% |
| Refused to Answer | 0.4% | 1.6% | 3.9% |   | 0.8% | 1.3% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |

**Table no. 18 shows that:**

A large majority among supporters of the Right and Charedim have a position opinion of Trump. In addition, a large majority of them say that his gestures towards Israel positively influence their attitude towards the President. By contrast, only 51% of supporters of the Center-Left have a positive view of Trump and this percentage says that his gestures influenced their positive view towards him. Meanwhile, 39% have a negative position on him.

**Table no. 19: Relationship between vote in April 2019 elections and positions on Binyamin Netanyahu**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Are you satisfied or not satisfied at the performance of Binyamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister? | Very Satisfied | 22.9% | 1.9% | 41.5% | 32.2% | 1.8% | 15.3% |
| Satisfied | 46.4% | 14.7% | 34.5% | 46.2% | 10.5% | 30.5% |
| Dissatisfied | 16.8% | 22.6% | 13.8% | 14.0% | 23.2% | 19.1% |
| Very Dissatisfied | 8.1% | 58.4% | 1.8% | 3.5% | 62.2% | 28.3% |
| Don’t Know | 4.9% | 1.8% | 5.9% | 4.1% | 1.5% | 4.8% |
| Refused to Answer | 0.8% | 0.5% | 2.4% |   | 0.8% | 2.0% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Right | Left and Center | Charedim | Likud | Blue-White | Total |
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| All told, is your opinion on Binyamin Netanyahu positive or negative? | Very Positive | 25.8% | 3.1% | 40.2% | 38.2% | 3.3% | 17.2% |
| Positive | 49.7% | 12.9% | 48.1% | 46.5% | 6.5% | 32.9% |
| Negative | 11.9% | 29.2% | 7.6% | 8.6% | 36.7% | 19.7% |
| Very Negative | 4.5% | 49.0% | 1.8% | 0.7% | 51.3% | 23.6% |
| No Opinion | 7.7% | 4.9% | 2.2% | 5.3% | 1.4% | 5.5% |
| Refused to Answer | 0.4% | 1.0% |   | 0.6% | 0.8% | 1.1% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 227 | 203 | 54 | 137 | 128 | 520 |

**Table no. 19 shows that**, as expected, a majority of Charedim and people on the Right are both satisfied with the performance of Netanyahu and have a positive opinion of the man. It is interesting to note that satisfaction with Netanyahu and positive views of him are higher among the Charedim than among supporters of the Right. Also as expected, there is a high percentage among the Center-Left which is not satisfied with Netanyahu’s performance and which has a negative view of him.

**Chapter C: Summary and Conclusions**

1. **Scope of support for various patterns of peace plans including the establishment of a Palestinian state**
2. 38% agree in principle to the establishment of a Palestinian state as part of a peace plan.
3. Thus far, the position in principle, but when we add to this position various items increasing security and ensuring that the settlements become a part of the State of Israel, there is a significant increase in support for the establishment of a Palestinian state. We speak here of a “package” of an agreement including the following items:
* A Palestinian state will be established throughout the Gaza Strip and in 80% of the West Bank. The Palestinian state will recognize Israel as the nation state of the Jewish People.
* 20% of the West Bank, which include the settlement blocs and isolated settlements, will remain under Israeli sovereignty. In exchange for those territories, Israel will offer territories of identical size within Israel bordering on Judea and Samaria, Gaza, and the Egyptian border in the Negev, including territories in which some 200,000 Israeli Arab residents live. No Jewish settlement will be uprooted.
* The Jordan Valley will remain under permanent Israeli control and Israel will remain the supreme security authority in all the area west of the Jordan River. There will be no Right of Return for Palestinians and Palestinian refugees will not enter Israel. In Jerusalem, all the neighborhoods on the Israeli side of the Security Fence, including the Old City, will remain under Israeli sovereignty. The Temple Mount will remain under Israeli sovereignty and the Kingdom of Jordan will continue its role as the guardian of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock.
* The Palestinian capital will be established on the eastern side of the city, in the area of the Arab neighborhoods beyond the Separation Fence, in which some 100,000 Palestinian residents live.

64% expressed their support for a package including these items.

1. Various items, if included in the plan, significantly increase support for the plan. The most significant increase comes with the plan including the downfall of Hamas (59% said that this would increase their support for the plan). The second item in importance is normalization of relations with Arab states (53% said that this would increase their support for the plan). The two following items in importance are the annexation of the Jordan Valley (49% said this would increase their support), and a defense treaty with the US (46% said this would increase their support).
2. The support of various figures for the plan may increase public support for the same.

About a quarter of interviewees said that the support of either Binyamin Netanyahu or Benny Gantz would increase their support for the plan. The expected contribution of Netanyahu’s support is slightly larger than that of Gantz, but the difference is not stark. (Netanyahu’s support would increase the support of 27% of interviewees and Gantz’s support would increase the support of 23% of interviewees). As expected, the support of both would bring about the agreement of people with different political views with the plan and increase support for the plan among more than a third of interviewees (37% say that the support of both figures for the plan would also increase their support for it).

The support of the Chief of Staff and the entire defense leadership causes almost half of interviewees (45%) to report an expected increase in their support for the plan.

1. The poll also examined the contribution of other items that could increase support for the plan from the percentage of principled support to percentage of support if the item is included in the plan. When interviewees are presented with the fact that the Palestinian state will include all of the Gaza Strip, most of Judea and Samaria, the percentage of support for the establishment of the Palestinian state (42%) is hardly different than the percentage of support for a Palestinian state without details on the scope of concessions.

The items which can increase support for the plan are as follows:

* Israeli security control between the Jordan and the Sea – 88%
* A defense treaty between Israel and the US – 87%
* The Palestinian leadership recognizes Israel as the Jewish nation state – 85%
* The Jordan Valley remains under permanent Israeli rule – 85%. In this context, it’s worth noting that when interviewees are asked of the consequences of the item speaking of full annexation of the Jordan Valley to Israel – 73% say that such an item would increase their tendency to support a peace plan in which a Palestinian state is established (45% say that they are certain this will increase their support for the plan and another 28% claim this will very much increase their support for the plan).
* The settlement blocs will be annexed to Israel – 77%. In this context, it’s worth noting that when the matter of annexation is asked on its own rather than as part of a peace plan in which a Palestinian state is established, just two thirds of interviewees (64%) support the annexation of settlement blocs and isolated settlements in Judea and Samaria to Israel, if the United States recognizes the annexation.
* The Temple Mount will remain under Israeli sovereignty and the Kingdom of Jordan will continue its role as guardian of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock – 77%
* An end to the Palestinian Right of Return to Israel – 77%
* The entire Jewish part of Jerusalem within the Fence including the Old City, the City of David, the Mount of Olives, and the Temple Mount will remain under Israeli sovereignty, but the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem (while noting that over 100,000 Palestinians live there) will be established as the capital of the Palestinian state – 70%
* Both the settlement blocs and isolated settlements will be annexed to Israel – 65%
* Isolated settlements will be annexed to Israel – 64%
* An exchange of territory with the transfer of Israeli citizens residing there to the Palestinian state – 48%

The only issue which reduces support for a Palestinian state is an exchange of territory without a transfer of Arabs along with it (with this condition, the percentage of supporters for the peace plan goes down to 34%)

* Exchange of territories without reference to a transfer of Arab population but noting that all of the Gaza Strip and 80% of the West Bank will be included in the Palestinian state – 37%
1. Preferred timing for publication:

The interviewees are divided almost equally between those who would want the plan to be published already before the election (47%) and those who want it published afterwards (37%). The rest have no position on the matter.

1. **Voting intentions for Knesset elections and expected consequences of support from the Prime Minister and the Opposition Leader for the plan for voting intentions**
2. In the present situation, the Right bloc and Charedim receive the support of 53.6% of interviewees as opposed to 33.5% support for the Center-Left bloc. 13% did not report support for any party.
3. The publication of Trump’s plan before the election, if accompanied by the support of both Netanyahu and Gantz, will have only a minimal influence: A decline of 1.7% in support for Blue-White (of opponents of the plan) and an unexplained increase of 1.1% for United Torah Judaism. The balance of blocs changes a bit in favor of the Right-Charedim bloc (55.7% as opposed to 31.8% for the Center-Left. 12.6% did not report support for any party.
4. **Positions on President Trump**
5. The balance of support for Trump leans significantly in his favor (69% expressed a positive position as opposed to 20% who expressed a negative position and 11% who expression no opinion).
6. According to interviewees, the American gestures involving transferring the embassy to Jerusalem and recognition of the Golan Heights contribute to positive views of Trump: 67% (almost everyone who said their view of Trump was positive) also said that the gestures either have a very positive influence (30%) or a positive influence (37%) on their view of Trump, 20% said the gestures have no influence, and just 6% said the gestures have a negative influence on their view of Trump.

Alongside this, it is likely that the gestures strengthened the positive assessments of President Trump but not likely that those who have a positive view of Trump arrived at the same due to his recent gestures.

1. **Positions on Prime Minister Netanyahu**
2. There is a near-tie between those who are satisfied and those who are not satisfied at Netanyahu’s performance as Prime Minister: 46% are either very satisfied with his performance (15%) or satisfied with his performance (31%); by contrast, 47% are either dissatisfied (19%) or very dissatisfied (28%) with his performance.
3. The percentage of people with a positive opinion of Netanyahu (50%) is similar to the percentage of people satisfied with his performance; 43% say their view of Netanyahu is negative.
4. **Changes in stance from the year preceding the interview**

In June 2018, a poll was conducted, some of whose questions were asked in the present poll as well. Regarding these questions, a comparative analysis was conducted between the findings of the present poll and the findings of the poll of 2018.

1. A decline occurred over the year in principled support for establishing a Palestinian state (from 44% to 38%).
2. No change occurred between these two dates in the number of supporters of a peace plan in which a Palestinian state will be established alongside various items ensuring Israeli security and making the settlements in Judea and Samaria part of Israel.
3. A decline occurred between these two dates in the number of supporters for an exchange of territories including the transfer of territories with their residents (from 60% to 48%).
4. No change occurred in the interim regarding Trump; meaning that the positive stances towards him are not the exclusive result of recent gestures, but rather are the cumulative result of Trump’s conduct towards Israel.
5. A decline occurred between the 2018 poll and the 2019 poll among those who were satisfied by Netanyahu’s performance (from 57% to 46%) and a similar increase among those who were dissatisfied by his performance (from 37% to 47%). Regarding general views of Netanyahu (positive or negative), only small, statistically insignificant changes occurred (a decline from 54% to 50% among those with a positive view of the man and an increase from 38% to 43% among those who have a negative opinion of him).